## Optimal Portfolio Under Worst-Case Scenarios

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## Outline of the talk

(1) The Growth Optimal Portfolio and Issues with Traditional Diversification Strategies
(2) Characterization of optimal investment strategies for an investor with law-invariant preferences and a fixed investment horizon
(3) Issues with these optimal strategies
(9) Extension to the case when investors have state-dependent constraints.

## Contributions

(1) A better understanding of the link between Growth Optimal Portfolio and optimal investment strategies
(2) Understanding how lowest outcomes of optimal strategies always happen in the worse states of the economy.
(3) Develop innovative strategies to cope with this observation.
(9) Implications in terms of assessing the risk and return of a strategy and in terms of reducing systemic risk

## Part I:

## Traditional

## Diversification Strategies

## Growth Optimal Portfolio (GOP)

- The Growth Optimal Portfolio (GOP) maximizes expected logarithmic utility from terminal wealth.
- It has the property that it almost surely accumulates more wealth than any other strictly positive portfolios after a sufficiently long time.
- Under general assumptions on the market, the GOP is a diversified portfolio.
- Details in Platen (2006)


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- Under general assumptions on the market, the GOP is a diversified portfolio.
- Details in Platen (2006).


## For example, in the Black-Scholes model

- A Black-Scholes financial market (mainly for ease of exposition)
- Risk-free asset $\left\{B_{t}=B_{0} e^{r t}, t \geqslant 0\right\}$

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\frac{d S_{t}^{1}}{S_{t}^{t}}=\mu_{1} d t+\sigma_{1} d W_{t}^{1}  \tag{1}\\
\frac{d S_{t}^{2}}{S_{t}^{2}}=\mu_{2} d t+\sigma_{2} d W_{t}
\end{array},\right.
$$

where $W^{1}$ and $W$ are two correlated Brownian motions under the physical probability measure $\mathbb{P}$.

$$
W_{t}=\rho W_{t}^{1}+\sqrt{1-\rho^{2}} W_{t}^{2}
$$

where $W^{1}$ and $W^{2}$ are independent.

## Growth Optimal Portfolio (GOP)

In the 2-dimensional Black-Scholes setting,

- The payoff of a constant-mix strategy is

$$
S_{t}^{\pi}=S_{0}^{\pi} \exp \left(X_{t}^{\pi}\right)
$$

where $X_{t}^{\pi}$ is normal.

- The GOP is a constant-mix strategy with $X_{t}^{\pi}=\left(\mu_{\pi}-\frac{1}{2} \sigma_{\pi}^{2}\right) t+\sigma_{\pi} W_{t}^{\pi}$, that maximizes the expected growth rate $\mu_{\pi}-\frac{1}{2} \sigma_{\pi}^{2}$. It is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\pi^{\star}=\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1} \cdot(\mu-r \mathbf{1}) . \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

Denote by $S_{\pi^{\star}}=S^{\star}$ the GOP.

## Market Crisis

The growth optimal portfolio $S^{\star}$ can also be interpreted as a major market index. Hence it is intuitive to define a stressed market (or crisis) at time $T$ as an event where the market materialized through $S^{\star}$ - drops below its Value-at-Risk at some high confidence level. The corresponding states of the economy verify

$$
\begin{equation*}
\text { Crisis states }=\left\{S_{T}^{\star}<q_{\alpha}\right\}, \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $q_{\alpha}$ is such that $P\left(S_{T}^{\star}<q_{\alpha}\right)=1-\alpha$ and $\alpha$ is typically high (e.g. $\alpha=0.98$ ).

## Srategy 1: GOP

We invest fully in the GOP.
In a crisis (GOP is low), our portfolio is low!


## Srategy 2: Buy-and-Hold

The buy-and-hold strategy is the simplest investment strategy. An initial amount $V_{0}$ is used to purchase $w_{0}$ units of the bank account and $w_{i}$ units of stock $S^{i}(i=1,2)$ such that

$$
V_{0}=w_{0}+w_{1} S_{0}^{1}+w_{2} S_{0}^{2},
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and no further action is undertaken.

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Example with $1 / 3$ invested in each asset (bank, $S_{1}$ and $S_{2}$ ) on next slide.

Strategy 2 vs the Growth Optimal Portfolio


## Strategy 3: Constant-Mix Strategy

- dynamic rebalancing to preserve the initial target allocation
- For an initial investment $V_{0}, V_{T}$ is given by

$$
V_{T}=V_{0} \frac{S_{T}^{\pi}}{S_{0}^{\pi}},
$$

where $\pi$ is the vector of proportions.

- constant-mix portfolios given by $\pi=\alpha \pi^{\star}$ with $\alpha>0$ and where $\pi^{\star}$ is the optimal proportion for the GOP, are optimal strategies for CRRA expected utility maximizers. Precisely, CRRA investors with a constant relative risk aversion coefficient $\eta>0$ have utility

$$
U(x)=\left\{\begin{array}{cl}
\frac{x^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} & \text { when } \quad \eta \neq 1 \\
\log (x) & \text { when } \quad \eta=1
\end{array}\right.
$$

and $\alpha=1 / \eta$.

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Example with $1 / 3$ invested in each asset (bank, $S_{1}$ and $S_{2}$ ).


- These three traditional diversification strategies do not offer protection during a crisis.
- In a more general setting, optimal strategies share the same problem...


## Part II:

## Optimal portfolio selection

## for law-invariant preferences

## Stochastic Discount Factor and Real-World Pricing:

The GOP can be used as numeraire to price under $P$

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\text { Price of } \\
X_{T} \text { at } 0
\end{array}\right\}=E_{Q}\left[e^{-r T} X_{T}\right]=E_{P}\left[\xi_{T} X_{T}\right]=E_{P}\left[\frac{X_{T}}{S_{T}^{\star}}\right]
$$

where $S_{0}^{\star}=1$.
Optimal Portfolio Selection Problem

subject to a given "cost of $X_{T}$ " (equal to initial wealth)

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where $S_{0}^{\star}=1$.
Optimal Portfolio Selection Problem

$$
\max _{X_{T}} \mathcal{U}\left(X_{T}\right)
$$

subject to a given "cost of $X_{T}$ " (equal to initial wealth)

## Cost-efficient strategies (Dybvig (1988))

Consider an investor with fixed investment horizon and objective function to optimize $\mathcal{U}(\cdot)$.

- Law-invariant preferences

$$
X_{T} \sim Y_{T} \Rightarrow \mathcal{U}\left(X_{T}\right)=\mathcal{U}\left(Y_{T}\right)
$$

- Increasing preferences

$$
X_{T} \sim F, Y_{T} \sim G, \forall x, F(x) \leqslant G(x) \Rightarrow \mathcal{U}\left(X_{T}\right) \geqslant \mathcal{U}\left(Y_{T}\right)
$$

$\square$

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A strategy (or a payoff) is cost-efficient
if any other strategy that generates the same distribution under $P$ costs at least as much.

The optimal strategy for $\mathcal{U}$ must be cost-efficient.

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## Optimal Portfolio and Cost-efficiency

Consider an investor with increasing law-invariant preferences and a fixed horizon. Denote by $X_{T}$ the investor's final wealth. The optimal strategy solves a cost-efficiency problem

$$
\min _{\left\{X_{T} \mid X_{T} \sim F\right\}} \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{X_{T}}{S_{T}^{\star}}\right]
$$

Reciprocally a cost-efficient strategy with a continuous distribution $F$ corresponds to the optimum of an expected utility investor for

where $G$ is the cdf of $\frac{1}{S_{T}^{*}}$

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Reciprocally a cost-efficient strategy with a continuous distribution $F$ corresponds to the optimum of an expected utility investor for

$$
U(x)=\int_{0}^{x} G^{-1}(1-F(y)) d y
$$

where $G$ is the cdf of $\frac{1}{S_{T}^{\star}}$.

## Sufficient Condition for Cost-efficiency

## A random pair $(X, Y)$ is comonotonic if there exists a non-decreasing relationship between them.

## Theorem (Sufficient condition for cost-efficiency)

Any random payoff $X_{T}$ with the property that $\left(X_{T}, S_{T}^{\star}\right)$ is comonotonic is cost-efficient.

This result holds in discrete and continuous markets.

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This result holds in discrete and continuous markets.

## Idea of the proof

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \min _{X_{T}} \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{X_{T}}{S_{T}^{\star}}\right] \\
& \text { subject to }\left\{\begin{array}{l}
X_{T} \sim F \\
\frac{1}{S_{T}^{\star}} \sim G
\end{array}\right.
\end{aligned}
$$

Recall that

$$
\operatorname{corr}\left(X_{T}, \frac{1}{S_{T}^{\star}}\right)=\frac{\mathbb{E}\left[X_{T} \frac{1}{S_{T}^{\star}}\right]-\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{1}{S_{T}^{\star}}\right] \mathbb{E}\left[X_{T}\right]}{\operatorname{std}\left(\frac{1}{S_{T}^{\star}}\right) \operatorname{std}\left(X_{T}\right)}
$$

We can prove that when the distributions for both $X_{T}$ and $\frac{1}{S_{T}^{\star}}$ are fixed, we have

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$$

We can prove that when the distributions for both $X_{T}$ and $\frac{1}{S_{T}^{\frac{\pi}{x}}}$ are fixed, we have

$$
\left(\mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{T}}, \mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{T}}^{\star}\right) \text { is comonotonic } \Rightarrow \operatorname{corr}\left[\mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{T}}, \frac{\mathbf{1}}{\mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{T}}^{\star}}\right] \text { is minimal. }
$$

## Explicit Representation for Cost-efficiency

## Theorem

Consider the following optimization problem:

$$
P D(F):=\min _{\left\{X_{T} \mid X_{T} \sim F\right\}} \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{X_{T}}{S_{T}^{\star}}\right]
$$

Assume $S_{T}^{\star}$ is continuously distributed, then the optimal strategy is

$$
X_{T}^{\star}=F^{-1}\left(F_{S_{T}^{\star}}\left(S_{T}^{\star}\right)\right) .
$$

Note that $X_{T}^{\star} \sim F$ and $X_{T}^{\star}$ is a.s. unique such that $P D(F)=c\left(X_{T}^{\star}\right)$

## Explicit Representation for Cost-efficiency

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## Black-Scholes Model

To be cost-efficient, the contract has to be a European derivative written on $S_{T}^{\star}$ and non-decreasing w.r.t. $S_{T}^{\star}$. In this case,

$$
X_{T}^{\star}=F^{-1}\left(F_{S_{T}^{\star}}\left(S_{T}^{\star}\right)\right)
$$

## Corollary

Path-dependent derivatives are always inefficient in the Black-Scholes framework.

## Part III:

## Investment under

## Worst-Case Scenarios

## Investment with State-Dependent Constraints

Problem considered so far

$$
\min _{\left\{X_{T} \mid X_{T \sim F\}}\right.} \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{X_{T}}{S_{T}^{\star}}\right] .
$$

A payoff that solves this problem is cost-efficient.
New Problem

$$
\min _{\left\{V_{T} \mid V_{T \sim F, \mathbb{S}\}}\right.} \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{V_{T}}{S_{T}^{\star}}\right] .
$$

where $\mathbb{S}$ denotes a set of constraints. A payoff that solves this problem is called a $\mathbb{S}$-constrained cost-efficient payoff.

## Type of Constraints

We are able to find optimal strategies with final payoff $V_{T}$

- with an additional probability constraint

$$
P\left(S_{T}^{\star} \leqslant s, V_{T} \leqslant v\right)=\beta
$$

- with a set of probability constraints

$$
\forall(s, v) \in \mathbb{S}, P\left(S_{T}^{\star} \leqslant s, V_{T} \leqslant v\right)=Q(s, v)
$$

where $Q$ is an appropriate given function and $\mathbb{S}$ verifies some properties.

- in particular, assuming that the final payoff of the strategy is independent of $S_{T}^{\star}$ during a crisis (defined as $S_{T}^{\star} \leqslant q_{\alpha}$ ),

$$
\forall s \leqslant q_{\alpha}, v \in \mathbb{R}, P\left(S_{T}^{\star} \leqslant s, V_{T} \leqslant v\right)=P\left(S_{T}^{\star} \leqslant s\right) P\left(V_{T} \leqslant v\right)
$$

## Independence in the Tail - Strategy 4: Path-dependent

## Theorem

The cheapest path-dependent strategy with a cumulative distribution $F$ but such that it is independent of $S_{T}^{\star}$ when $S_{T}^{\star} \leqslant q_{\alpha}$ can be constructed as

$$
F^{-1}\left(\frac{F_{S_{T}^{\star}}\left(S_{T}^{\star}\right)-\alpha}{1-\alpha}\right) \quad \text { when } \quad S_{T}^{\star}>q_{\alpha}
$$

where $t \in(0, T)$ can be chosen freely.
(No uniqueness and path-independence anymore).


## Independence in the Tail - Strategy 5: Path-independent

In a financial market that contains at least two assets that are continuously distributed, the cheapest path-independent strategy with a cumulative distribution $F$ but such that it is independent of $S_{T}^{\star}$ when $S_{T}^{\star} \leqslant q_{\alpha}$ can be constructed as

$$
Z_{T}^{\star}=\left\{\begin{array}{cc}
F^{-1}\left(\frac{F_{S_{T}^{\star}}\left(S_{T}^{\star}\right)-\alpha}{1-\alpha}\right) & \text { when }  \tag{5}\\
S_{T}^{\star}>q_{\alpha} \\
F^{-1}(\Phi(A)) & \text { when } \quad S_{T}^{\star} \leqslant q_{\alpha}
\end{array} .\right.
$$

where $A$ is given as
$A=\Phi\left(\frac{\frac{1}{\sigma_{1}}\left[\ln \left(\frac{S_{T}^{1}}{S_{0}^{1}}\right)-\left(\mu_{1}-\frac{\sigma_{1}^{2}}{2}\right) T\right]-\frac{\rho_{\star}}{\sigma_{\star}}\left[\ln \left(\frac{S_{T}^{\star}}{S_{0}^{\star}}\right)-\left(\mu_{\star}-\frac{\sigma_{\star}^{2}}{2}\right) T\right]}{\sqrt{\left(1-\rho_{\star}^{2}\right) T}}\right)$
with $\rho_{\star}=\frac{\pi_{1}^{\star} \sigma_{1}^{2}+\sigma_{1} \sum_{i=2}^{n} \pi_{i}^{\star} \sigma_{i} \rho_{1 i}}{\sigma_{1} \sigma_{\star}}$ and $\pi_{i}^{\star}$ denotes the $i-$ th element of the growth optimal portfolio $\pi_{\star}$.

Strategy 5 vs the Growth Optimal Portfolio


## Part IV:

## Investment under

## Worst-Case Scenarios

## Some numerical examples

## Copulas and Sklar's theorem

The joint cdf of a couple $\left(S_{T}^{\star}, X\right)$ can be decomposed into 3 elements

- The marginal cdf of $S_{T}^{\star}: H$
- The marginal cdf of $X_{T}: F$
- A copula C
such that

$$
P\left(S_{T}^{\star} \leqslant s, X_{T} \leqslant x\right)=C(H(s), F(x))
$$

## Other Types of Dependence

Independence in the tail:

$$
\forall s \leqslant q_{\alpha}, v \in \mathbb{R}, P\left(S_{T}^{\star} \leqslant s, V_{T} \leqslant v\right)=P\left(S_{T}^{\star} \leqslant s\right) P\left(V_{T} \leqslant v\right)
$$

This corresponds to the independence copula $C(u, v)=u v$

- We were also able to derive formulas for optimal strategies that generate a Gaussian distribution in the tail with a correlation coefficient of -0.5 .
- Similarly for Clayton or Frank dependence.


## Optimal Investment with a Clayton Tail Dependence

Let $Q^{\star}$ be the Clayton copula $Q^{\star}(u, v)=\left(u^{-a}+v^{-a}-1\right)^{-1 / a}$.
Assume that the payoff $V_{T}$ of the strategy has a cdf $F$ and has to satisfy the following dependency when the market is in a crisis
$\forall s \in\left[0, q_{\alpha}\right], y \in \mathbb{R}, P\left(S_{T}^{\star} \leqslant s, V_{T} \leqslant y\right)=F(y)-Q^{\star}\left(1-F_{S_{T}^{\star}}(s), F(y)\right)$
Then the cheapest strategy $V_{T}^{\star}$ with $\operatorname{cdf} F$ that verifies this
Clayton dependence in the tail is

$$
V_{T}^{\star}=\left\{\begin{array}{cll}
F^{-1}\left(\left[\left(F_{S_{T}^{\star}}\left(S_{T}^{\star}\right)-\alpha\right)^{-a}-(1-\alpha)^{-a}+1\right]^{-1 / a}\right) & \text { if } \quad S_{T}^{\star}>q_{\alpha} \\
F^{-1}\left(g\left(1-F_{S_{T}^{\star}}\left(S_{T}^{\star}\right), j_{F_{S_{T}^{\star}}\left(S_{T}^{\star}\right)}\left(F_{Z_{T}}\left(Z_{T}\right)\right)\right)\right) & \text { if } \quad S_{T}^{\star} \leqslant q_{\alpha},
\end{array}\right.
$$

where $Z_{T}$ is such that $\left(S_{T}^{\star}, Z_{T}\right)$ is continuously distributed (with copula $J$ ) and where $g$ is known explicitly:

$$
g(u, v)=\left[u^{-a}\left(v^{-a /(1+a)}-1\right)+1\right]^{-1 / a}
$$



## Some numerical results

We define two events related to the market, i.e. the market crisis $C=\left\{S_{T}^{\star}<q_{\alpha}\right\}$ and a decrease in the market $D=\left\{S_{T}^{\star}<S_{0}^{\star} e^{r T}\right\}$. We further define two events for the portfolio value by $A=\left\{V_{T}<V_{0} e^{r T}\right\}$ and $B=\left\{V_{T}<75 \% V_{0} e^{r T}\right\}$

|  | $T$ | Cost | Sharpe | $P(A \mid C)$ | $P(A \mid D)$ | $P(B \mid C)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| GOP | 5 | 100 | 0.266 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Buy-and-Hold | 5 | 100 | 0.239 | 0.9998 | 0.965 | 0.99 |
| Independence | 5 | 101.67 | 0.214 | 0.46 | 0.94 | 0.13 |
| Gaussian | 5 | 103.40 | 0.159 | 0.12 | 0.90 | 0.01 |
| Clayton | 5 | 102.35 | 0.193 | 0.24 | 0.91 | 0.02 |

## Conclusions

- Cost-efficiency: a preference-free framework for ranking different investment strategies.
- Characterization of optimal portfolio strategies for investors with law invariant preferences and a fixed horizon.
- Lowest outcomes in worst states of the economy
- Optimal investment choice under state-dependent constraints.
- not always non-decreasing with the GOP $S_{T}^{\star}$.
- not anymore unique
- could be path-dependent.
- Trade-off between losing "utility" and gaining from better fit of the investor's preferences.


## More Implications

- The new strategies do not incur their biggest losses in the worst states in the economy.
- can be used to reduce systemic risk.
- the idea of assessing risk and performance of a portfolio not only by looking at its final distribution but also by looking at its interaction with the economic conditions is indeed related to the increasing concern to evaluate systemic risk.
- Acharya (2009) explains that regulators should "be regulating each bank as a function of both its joint (correlated) risk with other banks as well as its individual (bank-specific) risk".
- An insight of this work is that if all institutional investors implement strategies that are resilient against crisis regimes, as we propose, then systemic risk can be diminished.

Do not hesitate to contact me to get updated working papers!

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## Part V:

## Proofs with Copulas

## Optimal Portfolio under Tail Dependence

## Copulas and Sklar's theorem

The joint cdf of a couple ( $\xi_{T}, X$ ) can be decomposed into 3 elements

- The marginal cdf of $\xi_{T}: G$
- The marginal cdf of $X_{T}: F$
- A copula C
such that

$$
P\left(\xi_{T} \leqslant \xi, X_{T} \leqslant x\right)=C(G(\xi), F(x))
$$

## Where do copulas appear?

in the derivation of "cost-efficient" strategies...

Solving the cost-efficiency problem amounts to finding bounds on copulas!

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \min _{X_{T}} \mathbb{E}\left[\xi_{T} X_{T}\right] \\
& \text { subject to } \quad\left\{\begin{array}{l}
X_{T} \sim F \\
\xi_{T} \sim G
\end{array}\right.
\end{aligned}
$$

## Proof of the cost-efficient payoff

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \min _{X_{T}} \mathbb{E}\left[\xi_{T} X_{T}\right] \\
& \text { subject to }\left\{\begin{array}{l}
X_{T} \sim F \\
\xi_{T} \sim G
\end{array}\right.
\end{aligned}
$$

The distribution $G$ is known and depends on the financial market. Let $C$ denote a copula for $\left(\xi_{T}, X\right)$.

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathbb{E}\left[\xi_{T} X\right]=\iint(1-G(\xi)-F(x)+C(G(\xi), F(x))) d x d \xi \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

The lower bound for $\mathbb{E}\left[\xi_{T} X\right]$ is derived from the lower bound on $C$

$$
\max (u+v-1,0) \leqslant C(u, v)
$$

(where $\max (u+v-1,0)$ corresponds to the anti-monotonic copula).


## Proof of the cost-efficient payoff

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\begin{aligned}
& \min _{X_{T}} \mathbb{E}\left[\xi_{T} X_{T}\right] \\
& \text { subject to }\left\{\begin{array}{l}
X_{T} \sim F \\
\xi_{T} \sim G
\end{array}\right.
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The distribution $G$ is known and depends on the financial market. Let $C$ denote a copula for $\left(\xi_{T}, X\right)$.

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\begin{equation*}
\mathbb{E}\left[\xi_{T} X\right]=\iint(1-G(\xi)-F(x)+C(G(\xi), F(x))) d x d \xi \tag{6}
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The lower bound for $\mathbb{E}\left[\xi_{T} X\right]$ is derived from the lower bound on $C$

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then $X_{T}^{\star}=F^{-1}\left(1-G\left(\xi_{T}\right)\right)$ has the minimum price for the cdf $F$.

## Sufficient condition for the existence

## Theorem

Let $t \in(0, T)$. If there exists a copula $L$ satisfying $\mathbb{S}$ such that $L \leqslant C$ (pointwise) for all other copulas $C$ satisfying $\mathbb{S}$ then the payoff $Y_{T}^{\star}$ given by

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Y_{T}^{\star}=F^{-1}\left(f\left(\xi_{T}, \xi_{t}\right)\right)
$$

is a $\mathbb{S}$-constrained cost-efficient payoff. Here $f\left(\xi_{T}, \xi_{t}\right)$ is given by

$$
f\left(\xi_{T}, \xi_{t}\right)=\left(\ell_{G\left(\xi_{T}\right)}\right)^{-1}\left[j_{G\left(\xi_{T}\right)}\left(G\left(\xi_{t}\right)\right)\right]
$$

where the functions $j_{u}(v)$ and $\ell_{u}(v)$ are defined as the first partial derivative for $(u, v) \rightarrow J(u, v)$ and $(u, v) \rightarrow L(u, v)$ respectively and where $J$ denotes the copula for the random pair $\left(\xi_{T}, \xi_{t}\right)$.

If $(U, V)$ has a copula $L$ then $\ell_{u}(v)=\mathbb{P}(V \leqslant v \mid U=u)$.

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If $(U, V)$ has a copula $L$ then $\ell_{u}(v)=\mathbb{P}(V \leqslant v \mid U=u)$.
When $\mathbb{S}=\emptyset, f\left(\xi_{t}, \xi_{T}\right)=F^{-1}\left(1-G\left(\xi_{T}\right)\right)$.

## Existence of the optimum $\Leftrightarrow$ Existence of minimum copula

## Theorem (Sufficient condition for existence of a minimal copula $L$ )

Let $\mathbb{S}$ be a rectangle $\left[u_{1}, u_{2}\right] \times\left[v_{1}, v_{2}\right] \subseteq[0,1]^{2}$. Then a minimal copula $L(u, v)$ satisfying $\mathbb{S}$ exists and is given by

$$
L(u, v)=\max \{0, u+v-1, K(u, v)\} .
$$

where $K(u, v)=\max _{(a, b) \in \mathbb{S}}\left\{Q(a, b)-(a-u)^{+}-(b-v)^{+}\right\}$.
Proof in a note written with Xiao Jiang and Steven Vanduffel extending Tankov's result.
Consequently the existence of a $\mathbb{S}$-constrained cost-efficient payoff is guaranteed when $\mathbb{S}$ is a rectangle. More generally it also holds when $\mathbb{S} \subseteq[0,1]^{2}$ satisfies a "monotonicity property" of the upper and lower "boundaries" and

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall\left(u, v_{0}\right),\left(u, v_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{S}, \quad\left(u, \frac{v_{0}+v_{1}}{2}\right) \in \mathcal{S} . \tag{7}
\end{equation*}
$$

