Path-dependent Inefficient Strategies and How to Make Them Efficient

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Cost-Efficiency	Main result	Example	Preferences	Limits
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Motivation / Context

- Starting point: work on popular US retail investment products. How to explain the demand for complex path-dependent contracts?
- ▶ Met with Phil Dybvig at the NFA in Sept. 2008.
- Path-dependent contracts are not "efficient" (JoB 1988, "Inefficient Dynamic Portfolio Strategies or How to Throw Away a Million Dollars in the Stock Market" in RFS 1988).

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What is cost-efficiency?

- Path-dependent strategies/payoffs are not cost-efficient.
- Explicit construction of efficient strategies.
- Investors (with a fixed horizon and law-invariant preferences) should prefer to invest in path-independent payoffs: path-dependent exotic derivatives are often not optimal!
- Examples: the put option and the geometric Asian option.

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Efficiency Cost

Dybvig (RFS 1988) explains how to compare two strategies by analyzing their respective efficiency cost.

What is the "efficiency cost"?

It is a criteria for evaluating payoffs independent of the agents' preferences.

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Some Assumptions

- Consider an arbitrage-free market.
- Given a strategy with payoff X_T at time T. There exists Q, such that its price at 0 is

$$P_X = E_Q[e^{-rT}X_T]$$

• *P* ("real measure") and *Q* ("risk-neutral measure") are two equivalent probability measures:

$$\xi_T = e^{-rT} \left(\frac{dQ}{dP} \right)_T, \quad P_X = E_Q[e^{-rT}X_T] = E_P[\xi_T X_T].$$

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Motivation

Investors have a strategy that will give them a final wealth X_T . This strategy depends on the financial market and is random.

• They want to maximize the **expected utility** of their final wealth X_T

$$\max_{X_{T}} (E_{P}[U(X_{T})])$$

U: utility (increasing because individuals prefer more to less).

They want to control the cost of the strategy

$$cost \ at \ 0 = E_Q[e^{-rT}X_T] = E_P[\xi_T X_T]$$



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Efficiency Cost

 Given a strategy with payoff X_T at time T, and initial price at time 0

$$P_X = E_P \left[\xi_T X_T \right]$$

• $F : X_T$'s distribution under the **physical measure** P.

The distributional price is defined as

$$PD(F) = \min_{\{Y_T \mid Y_T \sim F\}} \{E_P[\xi_T Y_T]\}$$

The "loss of efficiency" or "efficiency cost" is equal to:

$$P_X - PD(F)$$

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A Simple Illustration


Let's illustrate what the "efficiency cost" is with a simple example. Consider :

- A market with 2 assets: a bond and a stock S.
- A discrete 2-period binomial model for the stock S.
- A strategy with payoff X_T at the end of the two periods.
- An expected utility maximizer with utility function U.

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Real probabilities= $p = \frac{1}{2}$ $S_2 = 64$ $\frac{1}{4}$ $X_2 = 1$ р $S_1 = 32$ 1 - pр $S_0 = 16$ $S_2 = 16$ $\frac{1}{2}$ $X_2 = 2$ 1 - pр $S_1 = 8$ 1-p14 $S_2 = 4$ $X_2 = 3$ $E[U(X_2)] = \frac{U(1) + U(3)}{4} + \frac{U(2)}{2}$







(X and Y have the same distribution under the physical measure and thus the same utility)

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
X_2 , a payoff at T = 2



$$P_{X_2}$$
 = Price of $X_2 = \left(\frac{1}{16} + \frac{6}{16}2 + \frac{9}{16}3\right) = \frac{5}{2}$




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 $P_D = Cheapest = \frac{3}{2}$

$$P_{X_2} = \text{Price of } X_2 = \frac{5}{2} \quad ,$$


Cost-Efficiency	Main result	Example	Preferences	Limits
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$$P_{X_2}$$
 = Price of $X_2 = \frac{5}{2}$, Efficiency cost = $P_{X_2} - P_D$

Cost-Efficiency	Main result	Example	Preferences	Limits
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Real probabilities= $p = \frac{1}{2}$ and **risk neutral** probabilities= $q = \frac{1}{4}$.



Cost-Efficiency	Main result	Example	Preferences	Limits
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Cost-Efficiency

- The **cost** of the payoff X_T is $c(X_T) = E[\xi_T X_T]$.
- The "distributional price" of a cdf F is defined as

$$PD(F) = \min_{\{Y \mid Y \sim F\}} \{c(Y)\}$$

We want to find the strategy Y that realizes this minimum. Given a payoff X_T with cdf F. We define its inverse F^{-1} as follows:

$$F^{-1}(y) = \min \{x / F(x) \ge y\}.$$

Theorem

Define

$$X_T^{\star} = F^{-1} \left(1 - F_{\xi} \left(\xi_T \right) \right)$$

then $X_T^{\star} \sim F$ and X_T^{\star} is a.s. unique such that

$$PD(F) = c(X_T^{\star})$$

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Path-dependent payoffs are inefficient

Corollary

To be cost-efficient, the payoff of the derivative has to be of the following form:

$$X_T^{\star} = F^{-1} \left(1 - F_{\xi} \left(\xi_T \right) \right)$$

It becomes a European derivative written on S_T as soon as the state-price process ξ_T can be expressed as a function of S_T . Thus path-dependent derivatives are in general not cost-efficient.

Corollary

Consider a derivative with a payoff X_T which could be written as

$$X_T = h(\xi_T)$$

Then X_T is cost efficient if and only if h is non-increasing.

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Black and Scholes Model

Under the physical measure P,

$$\frac{dS_t}{S_t} = \mu dt + \sigma dW_t^P$$

Under the risk neutral measure Q,

$$\frac{dS_t}{S_t} = rdt + \sigma dW_t^Q$$

 S_t has a lognormal distribution.

$$\xi_T = e^{-rT} \left(\frac{dQ}{dP}\right)_T = e^{-rT} a \left(\frac{S_T}{S_0}\right)^{-b}$$

where $a = \exp\left(\frac{1}{2}Tb(r+\mu-\sigma^2)-rT\right)b = \frac{\mu-r}{\sigma^2}$.

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Black and Scholes Model

Any path-dependent financial derivative is inefficient. Indeed

$$\xi_T = e^{-rT} \left(\frac{dQ}{dP}\right)_T = e^{-rT} a \left(\frac{S_T}{S_0}\right)^{-b}$$

where $a = \exp\left(\frac{1}{2}Tb(r+\mu-\sigma^2)-rT\right)b = \frac{\mu-r}{\sigma^2}$.

To be cost-efficient, the payoff has to be written as

$$X^{\star} = F^{-1} \left(1 - F_{\xi} \left(a \left(\frac{S_T}{S_0} \right)^{-b} \right) \right)$$

It is a European derivative written on the stock S_T (and the payoff is increasing with S_T when $\mu > r$).

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The Least Efficient Payoff

Theorem

Let F be a cdf such that F(0) = 0. Consider the following optimization problem:

$$\max_{\{Z \mid Z \sim F\}} \{c(Z)\}$$

The strategy Z_T^{\star} that generates the same distribution as F with the highest cost can be described as follows:

$$Z_T^{\star} = F^{-1}\left(F_{\xi}\left(\xi_T\right)\right)$$

Consider a strategy with payoff X_T distributed as F. The cost of this strategy satisfies

$$P_D(F) \leq c(X_T) \leq E[\xi_T F^{-1}(F_{\xi}(\xi_T))] = \int_0^1 F_{\xi}^{-1}(v) F^{-1}(v) dv$$



Put option in Black and Scholes model

Assume a strike K. The payoff of the put is given by

$$L_T = (K - S_T)^+ \, .$$

The payoff that has the **lowest** cost and is distributed such as the put option is given by

$$Y_T^{\star} = F_L^{-1} \left(1 - F_{\xi} \left(\xi_T \right) \right).$$

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
The cost-efficient payoff that will give the same distribution as a put option is

$$Y_T^{\star} = \left(K - \frac{S_0^2 e^{2\left(\mu - \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\right)T}}{S_T} \right)^+$$

This type of power options "dominates" the put option.

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Cost-efficient payoff of a put



With $\sigma = 20\%$, $\mu = 9\%$, r = 5%, $S_0 = 100$, T = 1 year, K = 100. Distributional price of the put = 3.14 Price of the put = 5.57 Efficiency loss for the put = 5.57-3.14= 2.43

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Geometric Asian contract in Black and Scholes model

Assume a strike K. The payoff of the Gemoetric Asian call is given by

$$G_{T} = \left(e^{rac{1}{T}\int_{0}^{T}\ln(S_{t})dt} - K
ight)^{+}$$

which corresponds in the discrete case to $\left(\left(\prod_{k=1}^{n} S_{\frac{kT}{n}}\right)^{\frac{1}{n}} - K\right)^{\top}$.

The efficient payoff that is distributed as the payoff G_T is given by

$$G_T^{\star} = d \left(S_T^{1/\sqrt{3}} - \frac{K}{d} \right)^+$$

where $d := S_0^{1-\frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}} e^{\left(\frac{1}{2}-\sqrt{\frac{1}{3}}\right)\left(\mu-\frac{\sigma^2}{2}\right)T}$. This payoff G_T^{\star} is a power call option. If $\sigma = 20\%$, $\mu = 9\%$, r = 5%, $S_0 = 100$. The price of a geometric Asian option is 5.94. The payoff G_T^{\star} costs only 5.77. Similar result in the discrete case.

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
Similar result in the discrete case.

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Example: the discrete Geometric option



With $\sigma = 20\%$, $\mu = 9\%$, r = 5%, $S_0 = 100$, T = 1 year, K = 100, n = 12. Price of a geometric Asian option = 5.94. The distributional price is 5.77. The payoff Z_T^* costs 9.03.

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Utility Independent Criteria

Denote by

- X_T the final wealth of the investor,
- $V(X_T)$ the objective function of the agent,

Assumptions (adopted by Dybvig (JoB1988,RFS1988))

- Agents' preferences depend only on the probability distribution of terminal wealth: "law-invariant" preferences. (if X_T ~ Z_T then: V(X_T) = V(Z_T).)
- **2** Agents prefer "more to less": if c is a non-negative random variable $V(X_T + c) \ge V(X_T)$.
- The market is perfectly liquid, no taxes, no transaction costs, no trading constraints (in particular short-selling is allowed).
- The market is arbitrage-free.

For any inefficient payoff, there exists another strategy that these agents will prefer.

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Link with First Stochastic Dominance

Theorem

Consider a payoff X_T with cdf F,

Taking into account the initial cost of the derivative, the cost-efficient payoff X^{*}_T of the payoff X_T dominates X_T in the first order stochastic dominance sense :

$$X_T - c(X_T)e^{rT} \prec_{fsd} X_T^{\star} - P_D(F)e^{rT}$$

The dominance is strict unless X_T is a non-increasing function of ξ_T.

Thus the result is true for any preferences that respect first stochastic dominance.

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- State-dependent needs
 - Background risk:
 - Hedging a long position in the market index S_T (background risk) by purchasing a put option P_T ,
 - the background risk can be path-dependent.
 - Stochastic benchmark or other constraints: If the investor wants to outperform a given (stochastic) benchmark Γ such that:

$$P\left\{\omega\in\Omega \,|\, W_{\mathcal{T}}(\omega)>\Gamma(\omega)\right\} \geqslant \alpha.$$

• Intermediary consumption.

- Other sources of uncertainty: the state-price process is not always a monotonic function of S_T (non-Markovian interest rates for instance)
- Transaction costs, frictions: Preference for an available inefficient contract rather than a cost-efficient payoff that one needs to replicate.

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Conclusion

- A preference free framework for ranking different investment strategies.
- For a given investment strategy, we derive an explicit analytical expression
 - I for the cheapest strategy that has the same payoff distribution.
 - If or the most expensive strategy that has the same payoff distribution.
- There are strong connections between this approach and stochastic dominance rankings.

This may be useful for improving the design of financial products.