

Explicit Representation of Cost-efficient Strategies

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joint work with

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Contributions

- ▶ Deriving **explicitly** the cheapest and the most expensive strategy to achieve a given distribution under general assumptions on the financial market.
- ▶ Extension of the work by
Cox, J.C., Leland, H., 1982. "*On Dynamic Investment Strategies*," *Proceedings of the seminar on the Analysis of Security Prices*, U. of Chicago. (published in 2000 in *JEDC*).
Dybvig, P., 1988a. "*Distributional Analysis of Portfolio Choice*," *Journal of Business*.
Dybvig, P., 1988b. "*Inefficient Dynamic Portfolio Strategies or How to Throw Away a Million Dollars in the Stock Market*," *RFS*.
- ▶ Suboptimality of path-dependent contracts in Black Scholes model

Some Assumptions

- Consider an arbitrage-free and complete market.
- Given a strategy with payoff X_T at time T . There exists Q , such that its price at 0 is

$$P_X = E_Q[e^{-rT} X_T]$$

- P (“physical measure”) and Q (“risk-neutral measure”) are two equivalent probability measures:

$$\xi_T = e^{-rT} \left(\frac{dQ}{dP} \right)_T, \quad P_X = E_Q[e^{-rT} X_T] = E_P[\xi_T X_T].$$

Motivation: Traditional Approach to Portfolio Selection

Investors have a strategy that will give them a final wealth X_T .
This strategy depends on the financial market and is random.

- For example they want to maximize the **expected utility** of their final wealth X_T

$$\max_{X_T} (E_P[U(X_T)])$$

U : utility (increasing because individuals prefer more to less).

- for a given **cost of the strategy**

$$\text{cost at } 0 = E_Q[e^{-rT} X_T] = E_P[\xi_T X_T]$$

Find optimal payoff $X_T \Rightarrow$ Optimal cdf F of X_T

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Cost-efficient strategies

- Given the cdf F that the investor would like for his final wealth
- We derive an explicit representation of the payoff X_T such that
 - ▶ $X_T \sim F$ in the real world
 - ▶ X_T corresponds to the cheapest strategy (=cost-efficient strategy)
- ▶ What is cost-efficiency?
- ▶ **Explicit** construction of **cost-efficient** strategies.

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- ▶ What is cost-efficiency?
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
A Simple Illustration

Let's illustrate what the “efficiency cost” is with a simple example.
Consider :

- A market with 2 assets: a bond and a stock S .
- A discrete 2-period binomial model for the stock S .
- A strategy with payoff X_T at the end of the two periods.
- An expected utility maximizer with utility function U .

A simple illustration for X_2 , a payoff at $T = 2$


Real-world probabilities= $p = \frac{1}{2}$



$$E[U(X_2)] = \frac{U(1) + U(3)}{4} + \frac{U(2)}{2}$$

Y_2 , a payoff at $T = 2$ distributed as X_2

Real-world probabilities $= p = \frac{1}{2}$




$$E[U(Y_2)] = \frac{U(3) + U(1)}{4} + \frac{U(2)}{2}$$

(X and Y have the same distribution under the physical measure and thus the same utility)

X_2 , a payoff at $T = 2$

risk neutral

probabilities = $q = \frac{1}{4}$.




$$P_{X_2} = \text{Price of } X_2 = \left(\frac{1}{16} + \frac{6}{16}2 + \frac{9}{16}3 \right) = \frac{5}{2}$$

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
$$P_{Y_2} = \left(\frac{1}{16} 3 + \frac{6}{16} 2 + \frac{9}{16} 1 \right) = \frac{3}{2}$$

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


$$P_D = \text{Cheapest} = \frac{3}{2}$$

$$P_{X_2} = \text{Price of } X_2 = \frac{5}{2}, \quad \text{Efficiency cost} = P_{X_2} - P_D$$

A simple illustration for X_2 , a payoff at $T = 2$

Real-world probabilities = $p = \frac{1}{2}$ and **risk neutral** probabilities = $q = \frac{1}{4}$.



$$E[U(X_2)] = \frac{U(1) + U(3)}{4} + \frac{U(2)}{2}, \quad P_D = \text{Cheapest} = \frac{3}{2}$$

$$P_{X_2} = \text{Price of } X_2 = \frac{5}{2}, \quad \text{Efficiency cost} = P_{X_2} - P_D$$

Efficiency Cost

- Given a strategy with payoff X_T at time T , and initial price at time 0

$$P_X = E_P [\xi_T X_T]$$

- F : X_T 's distribution under the **physical measure** P .

The distributional price is defined as

$$PD(F) = \min_{\{Y_T \mid Y_T \sim F\}} \{E_P [\xi_T Y_T]\} = \min_{\{Y_T \mid Y_T \sim F\}} c(Y_T)$$

The “loss of efficiency” or “efficiency cost” is equal to:

$$P_X - PD(F)$$

Criteria for evaluating payoffs independent of the agents' preferences.

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Minimum Price = Cost-efficiency

Theorem

Consider the following optimization problem:

$$\min_{\{Z \mid Z \sim F\}} \{c(Z)\}$$

Assume ξ_T is continuously distributed, then the optimal strategy is

$$X_T^* = F^{-1}(1 - F_\xi(\xi_T)).$$

Note that $X_T^ \sim F$ and X_T^* is a.s. unique such that*

$$PD(F) = c(X_T^*)$$

Thanks to the uniqueness, we characterize all cost-efficient strategies.

Black and Scholes Model

Under the physical measure P ,

$$\frac{dS_t}{S_t} = \mu dt + \sigma dW_t^P$$

Under the risk neutral measure Q ,

$$\frac{dS_t}{S_t} = r dt + \sigma dW_t^Q$$

$\xi_T = e^{-rT} \left(\frac{dQ}{dP} \right)_T = e^{-rT} a \left(\frac{S_T}{S_0} \right)^{-b}$ where a and b are positive and constant.

Any path-dependent financial derivative is inefficient.

To be cost-efficient, the contract has to be a European derivative written on S_T and non-decreasing w.r.t. S_T (when $\mu \geq r$). In this case,

$$X^* = F^{-1}(F_S(S_T))$$

Geometric Asian contract in Black and Scholes model

Assume a strike K . The payoff of the Geometric Asian call is given by

$$G_T = \left(e^{\frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \ln(S_t) dt} - K \right)^+$$

which corresponds in the discrete case to $\left(\left(\prod_{k=1}^n S_{\frac{kT}{n}} \right)^{\frac{1}{n}} - K \right)^+$.

The efficient payoff that is distributed as the payoff G_T is given by


$$G_T^* = d \left(S_T^{1/\sqrt{3}} - \frac{K}{d} \right)^+$$

where $d := S_0^{1-\frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}} e^{\left(\frac{1}{2}-\sqrt{\frac{1}{3}}\right)\left(\mu-\frac{\sigma^2}{2}\right)T}$.

This payoff G_T^* is a power call option. If $\sigma = 20\%$, $\mu = 9\%$, $r = 5\%$, $S_0 = 100$. The price of this geometric Asian option is 5.94. The payoff G_T^* costs only 5.77.

Similar result in the discrete case.

Example: the discrete Geometric option



With $\sigma = 20\%$, $\mu = 9\%$, $r = 5\%$, $S_0 = 100$, $T = 1$ year, $K = 100$, $n = 12$.
 Price of the geometric Asian option = 5.94. The distributional price is 5.77.
 The least-efficient payoff Z_T^* costs 9.03.

Put option in Black and Scholes model

Assume a strike K . The payoff of the put is given by

$$L_T = (K - S_T)^+.$$

The payoff that has the **lowest** cost and is distributed such as the put option is given by

$$Y_T^* = F_L^{-1}(1 - F_\xi(\xi_T)).$$

Put option in Black and Scholes model

Assume a strike K . The payoff of the put is given by

$$L_T = (K - S_T)^+.$$


The cost-efficient payoff that will give the same distribution as a put option is

$$Y_T^* = \left(K - \frac{S_0^2 e^{2\left(\mu - \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\right)T}}{S_T} \right)^+.$$

This type of power option “dominates” the put option.

Cost-efficient payoff of a put

cost efficient payoff that gives same payoff distrib as the put option



With $\sigma = 20\%$, $\mu = 9\%$, $r = 5\%$, $S_0 = 100$, $T = 1$ year, $K = 100$.

Distributional price of the put = 3.14

Price of the put = 5.57

Efficiency loss for the put = $5.57 - 3.14 = 2.43$

Utility Independent Criteria

Denote by

- X_T the final wealth of the investor,
- $V(X_T)$ the objective function of the agent,

Assumptions

- 1 **Agents' preferences depend only on the probability distribution of terminal wealth:** “law-invariant” preferences.
(if $X_T \sim Z_T$ then: $V(X_T) = V(Z_T)$.)
- 2 **Agents prefer “more to less”:** if c is a non-negative random variable $V(X_T + c) \geq V(X_T)$.
- 3 The market is perfectly liquid, no taxes, no transaction costs, no trading constraints (in particular short-selling is allowed).
- 4 The market is **arbitrage-free** and **complete**.

Any optimal investment has to be cost-efficient.

Explaining the Demand for Inefficient Payoffs

① State-dependent needs

- **Background risk:**

- Hedging a long position in the market index S_T (background risk) by purchasing a put option P_T ,
- the background risk can be path-dependent.

- **Stochastic benchmark or other constraints:** If the investor wants to outperform a given (stochastic) benchmark Γ such that:

$$P \{ \omega \in \Omega / W_T(\omega) > \Gamma(\omega) \} \geq \alpha.$$

- **Intermediary consumption.**

② **Other sources of uncertainty:** Stochastic interest rates or stochastic volatility

③ **Transaction costs, frictions**

Conclusions

- A preference-free framework for ranking different investment strategies.
- For a given investment strategy, we derive an explicit analytical expression
 - ① for the cheapest strategy that has the same payoff distribution.
 - ② for the most expensive strategy that has the same payoff distribution.
- There are strong connections between this approach and stochastic dominance rankings. This may be useful for improving the design of financial products.
- Many extensions: With Steven Vanduffel (Brussels),
 - Generalization in a multidimensional market (also with Mateusz Maj (Brussels)).
 - Derivation of upper and lower bounds for indifference prices of insurance claims.
 - Extensions with state-dependent constraints.

- ▶ Bernard, C., Boyle P. 2010, “Explicit Representation of Cost-efficient Strategies”, available on SSRN.
- ▶ Bernard, C., Maj, M., and Vanduffel, S., 2010. “Improving the Design of Financial Products in a Multidimensional Black-Scholes Market,” *NAAJ*, *forthcoming*.
- ▶ Cox, J.C., Leland, H., 1982. “On Dynamic Investment Strategies,” *Proceedings of the seminar on the Analysis of Security Prices*, **26**(2), U. of Chicago. (published in 2000 in *JEDC*, **24**(11-12), 1859-1880.
- ▶ Dybvig, P., 1988a. “Distributional Analysis of Portfolio Choice,” *Journal of Business*, **61**(3), 369-393.
- ▶ Dybvig, P., 1988b. “Inefficient Dynamic Portfolio Strategies or How to Throw Away a Million Dollars in the Stock Market,” *RFS*.
- ▶ Goldstein, D.G., Johnson, E.J., Sharpe, W.F., 2008. “Choosing Outcomes versus Choosing Products: Consumer-focused Retirement Investment Advice,” *Journal of Consumer Research*, **35**(3), 440-456.
- ▶ Vanduffel, S., Chernih, A., Maj, M., Schoutens, W. (2009), “On the Suboptimality of Path-dependent Pay-offs in Lévy markets”, *Applied Mathematical Finance*, 16, no. 4, 315-330.

Proof of Main Result

Assume that ξ_T is continuously distributed.

Consider a strategy with payoff X_T distributed as F . We define F^{-1} as follows:

$$F^{-1}(y) = \min \{x / F(x) \geq y\}.$$

The cost of the strategy with payoff X_T is

$$c(X_T) = E[\xi_T X_T].$$

Then,

$$E[\xi_T F_X^{-1}(1 - F_\xi(\xi_T))] \leq c(X_T) \leq E[\xi_T F_X^{-1}(F_\xi(\xi_T))]$$

It comes from the following property. Let $Z = F_Z^{-1}(U)$, then

$$E[F_Z^{-1}(U) F_X^{-1}(1 - U)] \leq E[F_Z^{-1}(U) X] \leq E[F_Z^{-1}(U) F_X^{-1}(U)]$$

⇒ **Bounds for financial claims.**

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\Rightarrow Bounds for financial claims.